

## Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 780

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 ATHENS 7716

NODIS

DEPT REPEAT ANKARA AND NICOSIA AS DESIRED

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR GR

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CARAMANLIS

REF: A) ATHENS 7619; B) ATHENS 7605; C) STATE 236856; D) ATHENS 7402

1. SUMMARY. CARAMANLIS APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER BUT WAS "DISAPPOINTED" AT THE APPARENT LINKAGE OF NEW US MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GREECE'S STANCE ON NATO AND US BASE NEGOTIATIONS. HE FEELS THIS REFLECTS A LACK OF US TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN HIM OR, AT LEAST, A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING IN WASHINGTON OF WHAT HE IS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. HE DOES NOT WANT ASSISTANCE WITH ANY SUCH "STRINGS" ATTACHED. HE WANTS ME TO DISCUSS THIS AND RELATED MATTERS FULLY DURING MY CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. HE ALSO WANTS SUBSTANTIAL HELP NOW IN DEALING WITH TURKEY ON THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN PROBLEMS -- AND SOME "NICE WORDS" IN WASHINGTON ABOUT GREECE OCCASIONALLY. HE REAFFIRMED HIS TOTAL COMMITMENT TO FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSEST COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S. HE REMAINS LUKEWARM TO AN ECONOMIC TEAM OR A HARTMAN VISIT TO GREECE SOON. END SUMMARY.

2. THIS MORNING I HAD A LONG, PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS IN HIS APARTMENT IN DOWNTOWN ATHENS. PETROS MOLYVIATIS, HIS DIRECTOR

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OF CABINET, WAS THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT.

CARAMANLIS OPENED OUR MEETING BY SAYING HE HAD ASKED ME TO COME TO HIS PRIVATE RESIDENCE IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY PUBLICITY. HE SAID HE WANTED TO TELL ME VERY FRANKLY WHAT HIS REACTION HAD BEEN TO THE LETTER HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT FORD (REF C). HE SAID THAT WHILE HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE LETTER HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AND DEEPLY TROUBLED BY ONE PARAGRAPH. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT KNOWLEDGE OF THE LETTER TO BECOME PUBLIC OR THERE COULD BE A SETBACK TO OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE GREEK-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

3. THE PARAGRAPH THAT UPSET HIM WAS PARAGRAPH SIX IN REF C DISCUSSING POSSIBLE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND STATING THAT "IN THIS CONNECTION" IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR GREECE TO RESUME A FULL ROLE IN NATO AND CONTINUE TO SHOW APPRECIATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF US MILITARY FACILITIES IN GREECE. CARAMANLIS SAID HE INTERPRETED THIS PARAGRAPH AS PUTTING STRINGS AND CONDITIONS ON OUR POSSIBLE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT AMERICAN ASSISTANCE WITH SUCH CONDITIONS. HE HELD FORTH FOR QUITE A TIME ON THIS POINT AND ALTHOUGH THE WORDS AND PHRASES HE USED WERE ALONG THE LINES OF EXPRESSING HIS "DISAPPOINTMENT" ABOUT THE "LACK OF UNDERSTANDING" IN WASHINGTON OF THE SITUATION IN GREECE AND WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HIS TRUE FEELINGS AND REACTIONS WERE SHARPER AND MORE ANGRY.

4. CARAMANLIS MADE A LONG STATEMENT TO ME DESCRIBING THE DIFFICULT SITUATION HE FACED -- POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY -- WHEN HE RETURNED TO GREECE IN JULY 1974 AND OF THE PROBLEMS THAT CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THIS COUNTRY. HE ALSO REVIEWED ALL THE EFFORTS HE HAS BEEN MAKING TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS AND STRESSED AGAIN HIS COMMITMENT TO REBUILD AND STRENGTHEN GREECE'S TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. HOWEVER, HE

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SAID, WE MUST PLACE GREATER TRUST IN HIM TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. HE SAID HE KNEW THE SITUATION IN GREECE BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE AND THAT HE NEEDED OUR FULLEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH HIS DIFFICULT TASKS.

5. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT THE VERY TIME THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST TURKEY WAS BEING LIFTED AND WHEN

THE USG SHOULD BE IMPOSING CONDITIONS ON TURKEY TO RECEIVE US MILITARY SUPPLIES, IT APPEARED INSTEAD THAT WASHINGTON WAS IMPOSING CONDITIONS ON HIM AND GREECE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THIS, HE SAID, COULD BACKFIRE AGAINST WHAT HE AND WE WERE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH. HE SAID THAT IF THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO STORMY POLITICAL ATTACK. THEREFORE HE HOPED THAT THE FACT AND CONTENTS OF THE LETTER COULD BE KEPT AS A PRIVATE AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

6. CARAMANLIS SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO TELL NO ONE ELSE IN GREECE ABOUT THE LETTER EXCEPT FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS AND THAT HE IS ASKING BITSIOS TO DRAFT A BRIEF REPLY TO PRESIDENT FORD. CARAMANLIS SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE THE LETTER TO ME TOMORROW BUT, IN ANY CASE, WOULD SEE THAT I GOT IT BEFORE HE LEFT ON HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO LONDON ON OCTOBER 9. KNOWING FROM OUR PREVIOUS MEETING THAT I WOULD BE HAVING CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, CARAMANLIS BESEECHED ME TO DO EVERYTHING IN MY POWER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 781

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 ATHENS 7716

NODIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT ANKARA AND NICOSIA AS DESIRED

DURING MY STAY IN WASHINGTON TO CONVINCE TOP USG OFFICIALS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPPORTING HIM AND GREECE

DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD -- AND WITHOUT CONDITIONS. HE SAID THAT THE USG SHOULD NOT MIS-READ THE INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN GREECE AND CONCLUDE THAT BECAUSE EVERYTHING SEEMS RELATIVELY QUIET AND STABLE THAT THERE COULD NOT BE A MAJOR UPHEAVAL -- TRIGGERED BY CYPRUS OR A CONFRONTATION WITH TURKEY IN THE AEGEAN -- OR FOR PURELY INTERNAL REASONS -- WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES. HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE KNOWS WHAT HE IS DOING AND THAT HE IS UNSWERVINGLY A FRIEND AND ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, HE SAID IN A SOMEWHAT IRKED AND HAUGHTY MANNER, IF HE CONTINUES TO FIND LACK OF UNDERSTANDING FROM "AMERICA AND GREECE'S EUROPEAN ALLIES" AND CONTINUES TO BE ATTACKED AND VILIFIED HERE IN GREECE BY OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS, THE PRESS AND HIS COUNTRYMEN, HE WILL BE SORELY TEMPTED TO RELINQUISH HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AND LET WHATEVER HAPPENS HAPPEN. HE SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE MISTAKENLY BELIEVE THAT HE "RELISHES" POWER BUT THE FACT IS THAT HE ABHORS IT. HE IS DOING HIS MIGHTIEST TO DO WHAT IS GOOD FOR GREECE AND SERVE AS WELL THE INTERESTS OF AMERICA AND THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, BUT HE SAID HE HAD TO INSIST THAT HE BE SHOWN  
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GREATER UNDERSTANDING, CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT FROM HIS FRIENDS. THAT, HE SAID, WAS THE MESSAGE HE WANTED ME TO TAKE BACK AND EXPLAIN IN WASHINGTON.

7. I TOLD CARAMANLIS THAT I HAD LISTENED CAREFULLY TO EVERYTHING HE HAD SAID -- INDEED, HE HAD BEEN LECTURING ME FOR ALMOST 40 MINUTES WITHOUT INTERRUPTION -- AND THAT I WOULD SEE THAT THE ESSENCE OF WHAT HE HAD SAID WAS FAITHFULLY CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON. I SAID I WANTED TO TAKE ISSUE WITH HIM ON SOME OF THE POINTS HE HAD MADE CONCERNING LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG DURING THE PERIOD HE HAD BEEN IN OFFICE. FIRST AND FOREMOST, HOWEVER, I SAID THAT I WANTED TO TRY AND CLARIFY WHAT WAS AN APPARENT MIS-UNDERSTANDING DERIVED FROM THE PARAGRAPH HE MENTIONED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. I POINTED OUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LETTER'S OTHER PASSAGES AND SAID THAT I FAILED TO SEE WHY HE SHOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE LETTER. I SAID THAT IT DID NOT SEEM TO ME THAT "CONDITIONS AND STRINGS" WERE IMPOSED BY THAT PARAGRAPH IN THE LETTER AS HE SEEMED TO FEEL. RATHER, I SAID, THERE WAS A WHOLE WEB AND STRUCTURE OF RELATIONSHIPS TYING

GREECE TO THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. THESE INCLUDED THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND US MILITARY FACILITIES IN GREECE AMONG MANY OTHERS. IT WAS NOT THE PARAGRAPH IN THE LETTER THAT ESTABLISHED THESE RELATIONSHIPS BUT RATHER THE LETTER MERELY MADE PASSING REFERENCE TO THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. THE LETTER DID NOT IMPOSE STRINGS AND CONDITIONS, I SAID, BUT CIRCUMSTANCES DID. GREECE COULD NOT BOTH BE WOVEN INTO A FABRIC OF RELATIONS WITH THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE AND YET HAVE ITS GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF SUCH RELATIONS AND FREE TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTIONS IT CHOSE WITHOUT AFFECTING THESE RELATIONS. NATO WAS VERY MUCH A CASE IN POINT, AND THE ISSUE OF GREECE'S ROLE IN NATO HAD TO BE SQUARELY FACED AND DECIDED BEFORE TOO MUCH LONGER.

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8. I ALSO TOOK CONSIDERABLE TIME TO REVIEW AGAIN ALL THAT WE HAD DONE FOR CARAMANLIS -- IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT, ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, AND EXHIBITING THE UTMOST OF UNDERSTANDING, PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT -- DURING THESE PAST MONTHS WHEN HE HAS BEEN GUIDING THE COUNTRY THROUGH DANGEROUS SHOALS. CARAMANLIS LISTENED, NODDED HIS HEAD OCCASIONALLY IN AGREEMENT, BUT MORE OFTEN SHRUGGED AS THOUGH WHAT I WAS SAYING DID NOT REALLY COUNT FOR MUCH. (COMMENT. HE IS A HARD MAN -- PROBABLY AN IMPOSSIBLE MAN -- TO PLEASE.) AT THE END OF MY LONG SPIEL CARAMANLIS GRINNED GOOD-NATUREDLY, LEANED OVER AND SLAPPED MY KNEE IN A FRIENDLY FASHION, AND SAID THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH OUR GESTURES AND EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL BUT THAT WHAT HE WANTED NOW WERE "FACTS" AND "CONCRETE" ASSISTANCE.

9. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, CARAMANLIS SAID THERE WERE FOUR SPECIFIC THINGS HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE USG DO NOW:

(A) CYPRUS. PUT "SUBSTANTIAL PRESSURE" ON TURKEY NOW TO GET THE CYPRUS QUESTION SETTLED QUICKLY AND EQUITABLY. HE SAID THE TURKS HAVE NO EXCUSE NOW AND THE US SHOULD INSIST ON A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT -- AND PROMPTLY.

(B) AEGEAN. THE US SHOULD "TAKE A DIRECT AND DECISIVE POSITION" WITH RESPECT TO THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLAGRATION IN THE AEGEAN. THE US SHOULD

WARN THE TURKS -- AND MAKE THE WARNING PUBLIC --  
THAT IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY CONFLICT IN THE  
AEGEAN OR ALLOW THE PEACE IN THE AREA TO BE  
THREATENED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES. GIVEN THE VERY  
GREAT DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE -- AND  
IMMEDIATE INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION,  
BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA -- IN ANY HOSTILITIES IN  
THE AEGEAN, IT WOULD BE QUITE A NATURAL THING FOR  
THE USG TO MAKE A POLICY DETERMINATION ON THE  
MATTER NOW AND STATE IT CLEARLY SO AS TO FORESTALL  
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SOME TRAGIC AND IRREVERSIBLE SERIES OF INCIDENTS.  
IN ADDITION, THE USG SHOULD TELL THE GOT DISCREETLY  
THAT IT STRONGLY FAVORED TURKEY PROCEEDING WITH  
GREECE TO A PROMPT SETTLEMENT OF THE AIR-  
SPACE QUESTION AND THE SUBMISSION OF THE  
CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE TO THE WORLD  
COURT.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 782

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 ATHENS 7716

NODIS

DEPT REPEAT ANKARA AND NICOSIA AS DESIRED

(C) ASSISTANCE. US ECONOMIC AND MILITARY  
ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE PROMPT, "GENEROUS" AND WITH NO  
STRINGS ATTACHED, BOTH FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL

REASONS AND BECAUSE GREECE REALLY NEEDS THIS ASSISTANCE.

(D) FINALLY, CARAMANLIS SAID, TOP US OFFICIALS SHOULD SAY SOME "NICE WORDS" ABOUT GREECE OCCASIONALLY. HE SAID HE WAS ALWAYS READING STATEMENTS REFLECTING AMERICAN "UNDERSTANDING" OF TURKEY AND TURKISH PROBLEMS BUT HE RARELY SAW TOP LEVEL AMERICAN STATEMENTS AFFIRMING THAT THE GREEKS ARE RIGHT SOME TIMES TOO. HE SAID HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR PERSONAL ENDORSEMENT OF HIMSELF BUT RATHER STATEMENTS THAT WOULD SATISFY THE STRONG GREEK NEED FOR APPRECIATION, RECOGNITION AND RESPECT. (I REMINDED CARAMANLIS OF SOME RECENT STATEMENTS ALONG THESE LINES BUT HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MUCH MORE.)

10. CARAMANLIS SAID HE THOUGHT MY CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK WAS VERY TIMELY AND THAT HE WOULD BE RELYING ON ME TO EXPLAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GREECE FULLY AND FRANKLY TO TOP US OFFICIALS. HE SAID  
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THAT HE WAS FAST APPROACHING ANOTHER CRUCIAL MOMENT IN HIS TERM OF OFFICE AND PERHAPS FOR THE FUTURE OF THIS COUNTRY. THE NEXT 60 DAYS, HE SAID, WILL BE VITAL AND WE -- BOTH GREEK AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS -- CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANY MISTAKES. HE SAID HE WAS DOING MANY OTHER IMPORTANT THINGS THESE DAYS AS WELL -- SUCH AS HIS OFFICIAL VISIT LAST WEEK TO ITALY, TERRIBLY IMPORTANT PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS THAT HAD TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE NEW SESSION OF THE PARLIAMENT JUST CONVENED YESTERDAY, AND HIS IMPORTANT OFFICIAL VISIT TO LONDON LATER THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, HE SAID, HE CONSIDERED HIS MEETING WITH ME THIS MORNING AND MY OWN RETURN TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTER CONCERNING HIM NOW. HE COMMENTED AGAIN ABOUT THE "LINKAGE" OF NATO AND US MILITARY FACILITIES TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER. WASHINGTON MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND, HE SAID, THAT HE IS DOING ALL HE CAN AND THAT HE IS OUR VERY BEST FRIEND IN GREECE. WITH THE RAISING OF THE TURKISH EMBARGO, HE SAID, ALL THE OPPOSITION -- MAVROS, PAPANDREOU AND THE REST -- ARE CLAMORING PUBLICLY FOR HIM TO TAKE GREECE COMPLETELY OUT OF NATO AND TAKE OVER ALL US BASES AND MILITARY FACILITIES. WE MUST WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY --

AND WITH COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST -- IF WE ARE TO AVOID EVEN MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THIS COUNTRY. HE SAID HE HAD MADE A GREAT PERSONAL EFFORT TO MEET WITH EDITORS AND PUBLISHERS IN ORDER TO "GUIDE" THEM AND DAMPEN DOWN THE PRESS REACTION TO THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. HE BELIEVED, IT WAS VITAL, HOWEVER, THAT PROGRESS BE MADE SOON ON THE POINTS ENUMERATED ABOVE.

11. ECONOMIC TEAM VISIT. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD THOUGHT ANY FURTHER ABOUT A TEAM COMING FROM WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, ALONG THE LINES OF THE SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION ON THIS POINT WITH BITSIOS WHEN THEY WERE IN NEW YORK TEN DAYS AGO. CARAMANLIS STILL SEEMED UNEASY ABOUT SUCH A VISIT. HE SAID IF IT WAS IMPORTANT  
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TO US A SMALL TEAM OF TWO OR THREE "TECHNOCRATS" COULD COME TO ATHENS TO CLARIFY TECHNICAL DETAILS BUT HE WAS OPPOSED AT THIS TIME TO ANY KIND OF PROMINENT, HIGH-LEVEL, PUBLIC MISSION. ONCE THERE IS SOME "CONCRETE" ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN PROSPECT, CARAMANLIS SAID, WE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE FOR A HIGH-LEVEL VISIT. FOR THE PRESENT, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT IT INADVISABLE.

12. POSSIBLE HARTMAN VISIT. CARAMANLIS EXPRESSED NO NEW VIEWPOINT ON A POSSIBLE HARTMAN VISIT FROM THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED SEPTEMBER 26TH (REF D). I DO NOT THINK HE WOULD OBJECT TO SUCH A VISIT IF WE WANTED TO ARRANGE IT, BUT HE SEEMS TO CONTINUE TO WANT SOME KIND OF MORE POWERFUL INITIATIVE (APOLOGIES TO MR. HARMAN) FROM THE USG.

13. AS WE WERE BREAKING UP, CARAMANLIS AND I AGREED TO GET TOGETHER FOR A PRIVATE LUNCH FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON.

14. COMMENT: I HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT CARAMANLIS IS PLAYING ABSOLUTELY STRAIGHT BALL WITH US -- ALMOST ALL OF THE TIME-- AND I ALSO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST TO SUPPORT AND HELP HIM IN ANY WAY WE CAN. AFTER I LEFT CARAMANLIS I RAN INTO GEORGE MAVROS AT THE GDR NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION AND MAVROS -- WHO HAS BEEN VERY CRITICAL PUBLICLY OF US AGAIN RECENTLY -- TOLD ME THAT CARAMANLIS HAS ALSO BEEN WORKING ON HIM TO TONE DOWN HIS (MAVROS) CRITICISM OF THE US. MAVROS SAID THAT



CARAMANLIS WAS GOING TO GREAT LENGTHS TO EXPLAIN  
TO EVERYONE THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY  
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE'S  
NEED FOR US SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ON CYPRUS  
AND A WHOLE HOST OF OTHER PROBLEMS. WHEN I AM IN  
WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK I WILL BE PREPARED TO GIVE  
FURTHER BACKGROUND AND DETAIL CONCERNING THE  
PRESENT SITUATION IN GREECE AS WE SEEK TO  
CHART THE MAIN LINES OF OUR POLICY AND TACTICS

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HERE DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD.  
KUBISCH

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## Message Attributes

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